Forums, Bilateralism, and Multilateral Weakness in the Trump Era
According to J. G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism consists of coordinating national policies among groups of three or more states, whether through ad hoc arrangements or through international institutions." The United States was the driving force behind multilateralism during the Second World War, seeking mechanisms for the political resolution of conflicts. It promoted the creation of the Atlantic Charter (1941), the United Nations (1944), the Washington-based institutions—the IMF and the World Bank (1945)—and, later, the International Trade Organisation, known through its derivative, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947).
However, Donald Trump's administration has an international economic policy of tariffs that runs counter to global trade rules; by the withdrawal from multilateral mechanisms such as the Paris Agreement and the WHO in 2020, or UNESCO, and also by the suspension of funding for the OAS and its subsidiary bodies, both in 2025. This article analyses the United States' policy of fragmenting multilateralism, and its extension to other regional mechanisms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and the 2025 meeting between the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). It has divided countries into opposing camps.
At the ASEAN summit in Malaysia, held from 26 to 28 October, Timor-Leste became a member, and officials from China and ASEAN signed an update to the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). The United States, which is not a member, was invited and took the opportunity to broker a ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand, supervised by President Trump, which proved temporary. The President signed a trade agreement between the United States and Malaysia and Cambodia, setting a reciprocal tariff ceiling of 19% in specific sectors. With Thailand and Vietnam, he signed respective cooperation frameworks. These four cases serve the United States, among other things, to diversify supply chains for critical minerals and rare earths. Additionally, the Philippines agreed to create a joint military task force to increase military cooperation, especially in the South China Sea.
After the meeting, as part of his tour of Asia, Donald Trump visited Japan. He held a meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, with whom he established a trade agreement on new-generation nuclear reactors and rare earths. Japan also increased its military spending to 2% of GDP. In the interval between both conferences, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Busán, where they agreed that China would resume purchases of US soybeans and suspend for one year its export controls on rare earths, as well as a mutual temporary suspension of specific tariffs. This bilateral arrangement should have taken place within the framework of the WTO.
Days later, APEC—where the United States is a member—met on 31 October 2025 in South Korea, where it discussed supply chains for strategic goods (chips and critical minerals), among other issues. Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping did not attend. President Trump signed a non-binding trade agreement under which Seoul would be subject to lower tariff rates if it invested USD 350 million in the United States.
Meanwhile, the EU–CELAC meeting, held on 9 November of the same year in Colombia, was marked by significant absences. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, did not attend, nor did the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Neither were the presidents of France, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Argentina present. The absences reflected the weakness of this multilateral mechanism.
Finally, on 22 and 23 November, the first African G20 summit took place in Johannesburg. Before this, the United States had warned South Africa that it would not attend and that it should refrain from issuing a final declaration. President Cyril Ramaphosa promoted and achieved the final declaration, which the United States and Argentina rejected. The US absence stemmed from accusations of racism against white South African citizens. The conference discussed the problems of interest payments on total external public debt, the need to triple renewable energy capacity, the need to increase IMF quotas, and the necessity of boosting global investment to meet the Paris Agreement climate goals—issues unrelated to Washington's current policy.
Trump’s tour of Asia and his stance towards the G20 reveal the triumph of bilateralism as a strategy, replacing multilateralism. The countries of Southeast Asia—among the most heavily sanctioned by tariffs—were also those with which the most direct negotiations took place.
The US policy of advocating bilateralism results from its inability to lead the multilateral mechanisms it once championed.
