The geopolitics of development: key points of the EU-OEACP "post-Cotonou" Agreement

 

The geopolitics of development: key points of the EU-OEACP "post-Cotonou" Agreement

Dr Tomasz Rudowski^[1] , OBELA^[2]

15 November 2023 marked a milestone in relations between the European Union and the countries of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (OECS, Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States) with the signing of the so-called Samoa Agreement (SA), successor to the Cotonou framework that governed for more than two decades, which was an agreement between the European Union and its former colonies. The new pact, currently in the process of being ratified by at least two-thirds of the 79 members of the OEACP, represents much more than a technical adjustment: it is a barometer of how Europe is reconfiguring its influence in the Global South in a multipolar world. In this article, we will review the progress of the AdS negotiations, which would replace the Cotonou Agreement (see Figure 1), and analyse whether it represents a shift towards a more equitable partnership or one of dependency, with Brussels' interests at the forefront. The new agreement, with its six pillars, holds the potential to bring about positive change and foster a more balanced relationship. 

Figure 1. Partnership Agreement between the EU and OEACP members – current status

 

Source: Pichon, E. (2023).

 

The agreement establishes six pillars: democracy and human rights, sustainable economic growth, climate change, social development, peace and security, and human mobility. The agenda reflects Brussels' strategic interests. The rhetoric of "horizontal partnership" contrasts with mechanisms that are historically asymmetrical, particularly in the Caribbean and Pacific islands, where 31 island states affected by climate change face the dilemma of accepting conditionalities or risking financial isolation.

Figure 2. EU relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 

Source: European Union, 2023

 One of the most significant changes is the disappearance of the European Development Fund, similar to what the US did with USAID, now integrated into the EU's general budget, under the Neighbourhood and International Cooperation Instrument. With €79.5 billion allocated, the new system promises agility but generates scepticism: countries such as Jamaica and Barbados fear that European Union specific funds for the Caribbean, will be diluted in broader geographical categories such as 'America and the Caribbean'. It could further marginalise small islands in favour of continental economies.

            The '3+1' structure consisting of the basic agreement + 3 regional protocols, seeks flexibility but reproduces problematic dynamics. European outermost territories (such as Guadeloupe and Martinique) appear as preferred partners, marginalising sovereign states. In addition, Haiti, the only Caribbean country classified as "least developed", receives special attention, but without precise mechanisms to overcome its historical exclusion.

 According to the European Commission, one of the main advantages of the new agreement is that it helps to create a more modern partnership that addresses challenges related to climate change and pollution, migration, and peace and security. The new agreement can be a tool for implementing the Paris Agreement and promoting the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. However, there are doubts about the new agreement's ability to guarantee economic development. The asymmetry in terms of which interests and discourses prevailed in the negotiations is evident. The colonial legacy persists in AdS and is apparent in the use of moralising language and the clear protection of economic interests, as seen in the articles on sustainable investments and their preferential protection.

            The Caribbean protocol emphasises the 'blue economy' and climate resilience, urgent priorities for a region where hurricanes such as Irma (2017) devastated 90% of the GDP of some territories. However, a fundamental contradiction persists: while Brussels promotes sustainability, the Caribbean economic model relies on mass tourism (accounting for 12% of regional GDP) and extractive activities that degrade marine ecosystems (e.g., oil extraction from offshore platforms or sand used for tourist construction). These elements in the agreement raises concern and engages all stakeholders in fiinding viable solutions.

            Article 32 of the Caribbean protocol, which requires combating discrimination, has sparked controversy. Countries such as Jamaica and Dominica criminalise homosexual relations, and conservative sectors accuse the EU of "ideological colonialism". Cases such as Guyana's – which made its ratification conditional on clauses regarding labour migration – reveal how cultural tensions can delay ratification.

The AdS symbolises the paradox of contemporary cooperation: while it proclaims egalitarian horizons, its implementation could consolidate new forms of dependency. For the Caribbean, the challenge lies in negotiating without losing sight of three key points:  

1. Autonomy: preventing European funds from imposing agendas that are alien to local priorities.  

2. Real integration: overcoming linguistic and historical divisions to act as a cohesive bloc.  

3. Climate innovation: turning environmental vulnerability into leadership to access global green financing.

As Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey, architect of the negotiations, pointed out: "Europe knew what it wanted." Now it is up to the Caribbean to define what it is willing to accept – and at what price – in its relationship with the Global North. Ratification will be the first test for this agreement, which, more than a simple treaty, is a mirror of the contradictions of development in the 21st century. Cuba^[3] It is the only Caribbean country that negotiated the post-Cotonou agreement but did not sign it. Signed in November 2023 in Samoa, it has not yet entered into force. For this to happen, it must be ratified by the EU (by all Member States and the European Parliament) and two-thirds of the 79 members of the OEACP. A temporary protocol governs relations between the EU and the OEACP to avoid a breakdown in cooperation. Given the delays in ratification, the agreement could enter into force in 2027. The ratification process is urgent and should be expedited to allow its potential. 

In short, the AdS reflects historical asymmetries in development, where the rhetoric of horizontal cooperation contrasts with mechanisms that perpetuate dependencies, especially in the Caribbean, showing that Brussels' strategic interests continue to take precedence over a truly equitable partnership.